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If the nineteenth century fathered energy physics, Leibniz 
was its distant grandfather, as he argued relentlessly that a 
certain physical entity— vis viva, an early form of mechanical 
energy— is conserved in all interactions. This conservation 
entails that a certain kind of mechanism, sometimes called 
perpetuum mobile, is physically impossible. So it is of great 
interest to learn what Leibniz himself thought of it and 
how that relates to some broader themes in his thought, for 
example, the world’s eternity.
Early modern physics was of two minds about the possibility 
of perpetuum mobiles, theoretical and practical, and Leibniz 
is no exception in this regard. His first pronouncements on the 
issue show him confident that perpetual motion is feasible. In a 
draft from 1671, he outlines a mechanism with movable parts of 
different materials— wood and lead— alternately falling and rising 
in water without end, due to their different specific densities.1 
During his effervescent years of discovery in Paris (1672– 1676), 
Leibniz considers again the possibility of perpetuum mobiles. 
1 See his manuscript “Perpetuum mobile” of June 14, 1671, in Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. 
Achte Reihe: Naturwissenschaftliche, medizinische und technische Schriften; Erster Band: 1668– 1676, 
ed. E. Knobloch (Berlin: Berlin- Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 554– 561.
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In unpublished notes, he examines two proposed designs. One, 
originating perhaps with an unknown inventor, he dismisses as 
unworkable, on account of internal friction between the parts, 
which would bring the mechanism to a halt. Another, apparently 
proposed by himself, he endorses as technically possible.2 But it is 
a perpetuum mobile improperly so- called: it uses a steady supply 
of external energy, for example, from wind or running water, to 
power a cyclical mechanism.
In Paris, Leibniz meets Huygens, who introduces him to the new 
mechanics, including Torricelli’s principle and his own discovery 
that in a system of i colliding particles, the total mivi2 remains 
constant throughout the interaction. These two elements will 
put Leibniz on the path to his great discovery, in the 1680s, that 
a certain type of physical efficacy— which he baptized “live force” 
(vis viva) and on which he erected “dynamics,” a new science— is 
conserved in all mechanical processes. Leibniz henceforth ties 
his new basic principle— Conservation of Vis Viva— to the claim 
that a perpetuum mobile is impossible. However, the conceptual 
connection between these two ideas shifts as Leibniz’s thought 
evolves. In his 1686 Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis 
Cartesii, Leibniz takes the impossibility of perpetuum mobiles 
as a basic axiom and uses it as a yardstick for the right concept of 
force. Descartes’s allegedly falls short, as it allows for mechanical 
processes that increase motive force and hence can be used to 
power a perpetual motion. In the 1690s, the impossibility of 
perpetuum mobiles becomes a corollary of Conservation of Vis 
Viva, now a fundamental principle, itself justified by deeper, 
metaphysical principles, for example the equality of the full cause 
and the whole effect, as in Leibniz’s unpublished Dynamica de 
potentia et legibus naturae (1689– 1690).
2 See V. Kirsanov, “Leibniz in Paris,” in The Global and the Local: The History of Science and the 
Cultural integration of Europe, ed. M. Kokowski (Krakow: 2008, 353– 358.
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In any event, from 1686 on, Leibniz is resolute that perpetuum 
mobiles are physically impossible. Yet in 1715, a certain Karl 
Elias Bessler comes forward, under the nom de plume Orffyreus, 
claiming to have invented a self- sustaining mechanism. Instead 
of dismissing him as a fraud, Leibniz encourages further study 
of Orffyreus’s machine and declares: “he is one of my friends.” 
Leibniz’s disciple Christian Wolff does no better: though an ardent 
believer in Conservation of Vis Viva, which rules out perpetuum 
mobiles, Wolff too extols the study of Orffyreus’s device: allegedly 
“philosophers no doubt will receive from [its study] new light, so as 
to know by it other hidden things.” To be sure, the machine turned 
out to be an ingenious hoax, secretly powered from the outside by 
Orffyreus’s acolytes from a chamber adjacent to it.3
Now, a closer look at Leibniz’s usage of “perpetuum mobile” 
reveals an ambiguity— which likewise plagues much early modern 
discussion of the idea. First, a “physical” perpetuum mobile is an 
artificial setup in which the total quantity of “force” increases over 
time. Leibniz declares this sort of mechanism to be impossible, on 
account of vis viva, the exemplar of force, being conserved in the 
world. Second, on the other hand Leibniz in his exchange with 
Denis Papin mentions a “mathematical” perpetuum mobile: an 
idealized mechanism in which friction has been abstracted away.4 
These devices are perpetuum mobiles in the sense that, once set in 
motion, they would go on forever.5 Such idealized machines are 
3 Bessler described and advertised his invention in Bessler (1719). Leibniz discussed it briefly, 
endorsing Orffyreus, in Leibniz, Nachgelassene Schriften physikalischen, mechanischen und 
technischen Inhalts, ed. E. Gerland (Leipzig Teubner, 1906), 119– 121. Wolff extolled the alleged 
philosophical merits of Orffyreus’s mechanism in Wolff, Mathematisches Lexicon (Leipzig, 1716), 
1042– 1043. A  brief account of the Orffyreus episode is in F. Klemm, “Vom Perpetuum mobile 
zum Energieprinzip,” in F. Klemm and H. Schimank, Julius Robert Mayer zum 150. Geburtstag 
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1965), 15– 17.
4 See Gideon Freudenthal, “Perpetuum Mobile:  The Leibniz- Papin Controversy,” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002), 609.
5 An elementary example is a pendulum oscillating in a frictionless medium or in a vacuum. 
Another, closer to the spirit of Leibniz’s Brevis demonstratio, is a perfectly elastic ball dropped 
from rest on a rigid surface in a vacuum.
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fully in accord with Leibniz’s metaphysical dynamics, insofar as they 
work either by perpetually converting actual vis viva into latent (i.e., 
kinetic energy into potential) and vice versa; or by circulating vis 
viva around the system, for example, as a Newton pendulum does. 
The more interesting question is, are such Leibnizian perpetuum 
mobiles ever instantiated in the natural world? Leibniz seems 
to think that at least one exists: the world itself. In his exchange 
with Clarke, he comes to reproach Newtonians for their theory of 
matter. That doctrine postulates hard atoms: rigid, inelastic bits 
of matter, which are peculiar in that they “destroy motion,” as it 
were; speed— and so Leibnizian vis viva, a function of it— is lost 
in rigid- body collisions. The long- term yet predictable outcome of 
ever more Newtonian interactions is that as matter loses motion, 
the world will slow down or even grind to a halt. “God had not, it 
seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion,” Leibniz 
observes reproachfully of the universe according to Newton.6 
This consequence, however, Newton was glad to accept, thinking 
it showed God indispensable to a world that needs periodic 
rewinding. Leibniz, in contrast, thought his own cosmology— in 
which all matter is endowed with a grand principe du ressort and 
animated by a constant amount of vis viva— does better justice to 
God’s craftsmanship. The Leibnizian cosmos allegedly needs no 
rewinding, as the relative motion of its parts are conserved, which 
makes it a physical analogue of Leibniz’s mathematical perpetuum 
mobile. Thus, the world is an eternally self- moving machine.
Still, we have reasons to question this conclusion, from facts 
that even Leibniz knew. To see that, consider an insightful point 
Papin raised in his debate with Leibniz.7 Leibniz had remarked, 
predictably, that the Cartesian measure of force, which Papin 
6 Leibniz’s First Letter to Clarke, sec. 4, in The Leibniz- Clarke Correspondence, ed. 
H. G. Alexander (Manchester: 1970), 11.
7 The definitive study of the exchange between Leibniz and Papin is Freudenthal, “Perpetuum 
mobile.”
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defended, entails the possibility of physical perpetuum mobiles, 
or mechanisms that increase force. In response, Papin accepted 
that force cannot be increased but objected that, sometimes, force 
may be lost; for instance, in inelastic collisions. To deflect this 
difficulty, Leibniz privately granted that it “is not impossible” to 
think that some motion “in the bodies before the collision has 
been transferred to an insensible matter,” such that, though the 
motion of the colliding bodies themselves may not be conserved, 
“it is nevertheless conserved in the total universe by an exceptional 
contrivance of nature.”8 That may be so, but this move fails 
to solve a grave problem for Leibniz: some of this transferred 
motion is lost forever, in that it cannot be retransmitted from 
the insensible parts of matter back to the macroscopic bodies. 
Some motion, and thus some Leibnizian vis viva, is dissipated, 
or irreversibly transferred to the smallest parts. Over time, these 
losses accumulate, draining the motion out of the large- scale 
matter in the world, threatening Leibniz’s system in two ways. 
First, bodies will grind to a halt relative to each other, just as a 
manmade machine does, on account of friction and drag.9 Leibniz 
in fact knows that friction is the greatest impediment to the 
practical feasibility of self- sustaining mechanisms: as he examined 
a proposed perpetuum mobile in his Paris years, he noted with 
skepticism that friction “will considerably hinder the motion” of 
the machine’s moving parts.10 Put more generally, friction, drag, 
dampened oscillations, wear, material fatigue, and other dissipative 
factors threaten the Leibnizian perfection of this world— they turn 
8 Leibniz, manuscript LH XXXV, 9, 7, pp. 24r– v, cited and translated in Freudenthal, “Perpetuum 
mobile,” 623.
9 Drag forces become relevant at large scales in the Leibnizian cosmos, because he operates with a 
vortex theory of planetary motions, unlike Newton’s gravitation theory of distant attraction across 
empty space. Though the Leibnizian ether in which planets swirl around is very thin, it is neverthe-
less a resisting medium, and motion through it generates drag forces, which dissipate speed.
10 Leibniz, manuscript LH XXXVII, 5, pp. 58– 59r– v. For an account of the machine’s design, see 
Kirsanov, “Leibniz in Paris,” 355.
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it from a perpetuum mobile into rattling machinery, with every 
turn jangling imperceptibly to a halt. Second, because of that, the 
variety of speeds— hence the individual values of vis viva in single 
bodies— diminishes in the world, thereby reducing the varietates 
formarum (diversity of forms), which for Leibniz is a mark of this 
world’s perfection.11 To put it in anachronistic language, Leibniz, 
as he discovered friction and other types of lost motion, came face 
to face with entropy but chose to look away, perhaps too dismayed 
to contemplate what it would do to his optimal, eternally, self- 
moving cosmos.
11 Leibniz claims that the “diversity of forms” is a criterion and mark of optimality for possible 
worlds in his 1697 On the Ultimate Origination of Things; see Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, ed. and 
trans. R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 149– 154.
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